中文關鍵字：
油品產業；浮動油價；台灣動態一般性均衡；聯合行為；
摘要：
2001 年 10 月於立法院三讀通過「石油管理法」，確立我國油品市場全面開放的基本架構。然而，考量我國僅餘台灣中油公司和台塑石化等兩家業者，引發雙占市場可能產生聯合訂價隱憂，故2007年經濟部宣佈「浮動油價機制」讓油價調整回歸市場並與國際接軌。然而，即使存在油價調整公式，其對於市場之自由競爭、業者行為影響、消費者權益等面向，仍引發諸多討論。因此，本文中探討除了國內施行「浮動油價機制」外，亦參考亞鄰國家（中國大陸、南韓）與歐、美的訂價機制及產業營運狀況，期能瞭解在該訂價機制下是否影響產業競爭。
研究結果發現，中國大陸、南韓及英美等國家在油品產業鏈中的石油煉製部份僅有少數供應者，惟加油站市場則視地理區位和人口數量，存在較多品牌業者，且發展趨勢朝各種商業模式多元化推展。就價格調整機制而言，僅中國大陸設有油品價格上限和下限，多數國家並未對油品進一步設立油價訂價機制，而係讓市場自由訂價及競爭，大體上僅會透過行政措施（例如環保要求、庫存天數、油品品質、稅費徵收）作為管理方式，而油價機制之有無並不影響加油站市場競爭。
觀諸世界各國競爭法主管機關執法，多國關注油品市場透明化，以幫助消費者做出更明智的決定，並鼓勵更有效的競爭。此外，觀察南韓、新加坡、香港、日本及歐盟和英美等國的油品產業，其油品市場均已自由化，並且由市場供需決定最終價格，對照我國現況，雖然施行油價機制，但仍有主管機關介入的影子，且相關法規並未鼓勵業者從事多元化業務推廣，與國際發展趨勢並不一致，故宜放寬石油管理法規範和取消油價公式，讓市場自由運作。
另一方面，「國內汽、柴油浮動油價調整機制作業原則」非屬經立法院通過且總統公布之法律，又非屬法規命令，得否適用公平交易法第46條規定，向有爭議。因此，短期內在浮動油價機制仍沿用，亦未立法排除公平法適用的前提下，建議公平會訂定油品市場案件處理原則，持續蒐集國內油品訂價是否有反競爭的作為。長期而言，油品價格仍宜回歸市場機制，則公平會仍應持續檢視產業競爭情況，惟若考慮產業主管機關具有較為專業的產業知識，更適合處理產業相關議題，而將油品行業排除於競爭法規範之外時，仍宜由目的事業主管機關，協調公平交易委員會將競爭法精神納入石油管理法中，使符合公平交易法規定，則可適用公平交易法第46條，同時善盡目的事業主管機關管理與督導的責任。
Domestic oil market was monopolized by CPC in the early stage. However, the “Regulations Governing Gas Station Installation and Administration” had published since 1987 then open the retail sales. Thereafter the Ministry of Economic Affairs had published the “Regulations on the Management of Production Licenses for Import and Export of Petroleum and Petroleum Products” in order to promote enterprise to participate the oil market in 1996. Because oil market of Taiwan was monopolized by CPC before September 2000, the domestic oil price was decided by international oil price and revenue requirement of CPC. Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs had abolished the oil price formula after Formosa Petrochemical entered into the market and then the oil price was decided by import oil cost of each company. Furthermore, Legislative Yuan of Taiwan passed the “Petroleum Managed Law” in October 2001 and established the framework for full liberalization of oil market. However, in order to avoid concerted action of oil pricing and the government interruption, Executive Yuan of Taiwan offered the improving measure of oil formula in 2006 and the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced the floating oil price mechanism in 2007. The goal of the mechanism was to allow oil price adjustments to return to the market and align with international situations. In spite of practicing the oil formula, there were still some disputes about competition and behavior of enterprise in the market. The key themes of this study is to understand the impact of competition behavior and the profit of enterprise after practicing oil formula, and the restriction of competition behavior in vertical marketing system of oil supply and demand under the situation of oligopoly by CPC and Formosa Petrochemical.
The purpose of the study includes (1) collecting the oil industry information and oil pricing mechanism of Asian neighboring countries, European countries, United Kingdom and the United States; (2) analyzing the enforcement stance of authorities and related cases in the Asian neighboring countries, European countries, United Kingdom and the United States; (3) studying the appropriateness and necessity of floating oil price mechanism in Taiwan and the impact of economy, industry and consumer under oil price mechanism; (4) analyzing the vertical relationship of oil industry in Taiwan and to investigate whether there are price restrictions and other related restrictions on competition then refer to the relative authorities.
We find out that the upstream of oil industry in Asian neighboring countries, European countries, United Kingdom and the United States had few supplier because of high capital expense and scale economic and the downstream of oil industry (gasoline station) had a lot of competitors. Besides, the business model in gasoline station market was full of diversity. Secondly, the oil pricing mechanism was practicing in China and Taiwan and that of in the other countries was decided by the free market. However, most counties was take some measures such as environment requirement, oil quality, tax and days of inventory to manage the oil market. Thirdly, the owner of gasoline station would like to adopt the way of non-price competition to draw client and the geographic character was also an important factor for competition. Besides, in many countries, competition authorities tried to distinguish lawful from unlawful conduct in the absence of direct evidence of an agreement. However, it has often been a challenge to prove that there are problems indeed as there are often no explicit and illicit horizontal agreements. In addition, there were only two oil supplier (CPC and Formosa) in Taiwan and CPC had its own gasoline station. When CPC operate its own gasoline station and provided oil products to franchisee in the same time, it would lead to the competitive-cooperative situation. Moreover, there were a lot of discussions and disputes for floating oil price mechanism in Taiwan such as the basis of calculation, weight setting, item, exchange rate et al.
According to the result, we recommend the government to improve the transparency of the effective retail price to allow consumers to make more informed choices and increase competition in the petroleum market. Secondly, it was important to clarify the accounting system of oil company for revising the parameters of floating oil price mechanism in Taiwan. We suggested that the floating oil price mechanism should be reviewed per year in the short run and we expect to see the oil price would be decided by the market in the long term. Thirdly, the government should amend Petroleum Administration Act to coordinate the interaction between Petroleum Administration Act and Fair Trade Act in order to show the spirit of Competition Law in the Petroleum Administration Act when oil price was decided by the market.
